ABSTRACT Empathy is relevant to sociomoral development, especially in relation to prosociality and the penalization of acts as faults and crimes. The objective of this research was to test whether empathy is a predictor of prosociality and of perceptions of seriousness of delinquent acts among research participants in Argentina and Spain. The Argentinian sample comprised 215 high school and university students. The Spanish sample comprised 199 university students. The proposed theoretical model showed good fit in both countries. Although empathy was (...) found to predict prosocial conduct more than the perception of the seriousness acts as offenses and crimes, empathy was a significant of both prosocial conduct and perception of the seriousness acts as faults and crimes. Thus, the importance of empathy in morality was supported for both countries, supporting the influence of in different cultural context. (shrink)

Se explora la comprensión del carácter irremplazable del ser personal en adultos mediante un estudio cualitativo con grupos focales. Los sujetos habían visto un capítulo de Black Mirror en el que una persona reemplaza por un androide a su pareja fallecida. Siguiendo los lineamientos de la Teoría Fundamentada se construyeron estas categorías: lo negativo o shock; irrealidad; temporalidad; espontaneidad; un todo; algo más; irreemplazabilidad. Surgió la referencia a algo fundamental en la persona, no comprendido en sus cualidades. Enmarca el estudio (...) una reflexión sobre la relevancia de estudios cualitativos en la llamada filosofía experimental. (shrink)

In this chapter, we explore Johann Euler’s electrical theory and mathematization. In it, he developed an ether whose hydrodynamical aspects he used to mathematize his theory. His explanations, however, were centered on mechanistic (that is, real and tangible) explanations, not mathematical arguments and proofs.

After discussing all three authors selected in the historical research and contextualizing them with the help of the Inferential Conception and Hacking’s styles of reasoning, we can wrap things up in this chapter and discuss the final philosophical points, including the sum of styles of mathematization. That is the concept of epistemic projects—an umbrella-like concept that swallows styles of mathematizations that are in some way similar to one another. In it, Aepinus’ and Coulomb’s styles can be seen as part of (...) the same project—named the Newtonian project—because they share a defining characteristic: they are guided by mathematical reasoning. Johann Euler’s case differs. Euler’s style is guided by his mechanicism (and mechanistic considerations); therefore, he belongs to another project that only received development a century later. (shrink)

This book studies the mathematization of physics, with a special emphasis on eighteenth century electrostatics as a case study. The mathematization of a scientific field is a fruitful yet underdeveloped topic that can be seen through different lenses. A noticeable one is the Inferential Conception proposed by Mark Colyvan and Otávio Bueno. In this regard, the use of mathematics is understood as a set of mappings relating the physical realm and the mathematical realm. However, the historical process related to the (...) use of mathematics remains unsolved; philosophical frameworks usually have a hard time dealing with historical dimensionality. Therefore, this book provides a study of the historical process of mathematization going beyond the framework in order to explain the use of mathematics a-historically, using the aforementioned investigation of eighteenth century electrostatics. The research developed gravitates around two centers: the history of physics and the philosophy of science, making the book of equal importance to both historians and philosophers of science. (shrink)

This chapter discusses Charles Coulomb’s works on electricity, with a special focus on how he approached mathematization. Coulomb deduced theorems about the electric fluid while ignoring mechanistic considerations that could alter his findings. Therefore, contrary to Franz Aepinus’ case, Coulomb’s mathematics-oriented theory-building has an antagonistic relationship to mechanistic considerations. Bluntly put, he took mathematics so far that even well-formulated physical questions inside his theory of electricity were ignored.

This chapter investigates Franz Aepinus’ theory of electrical phenomena. His ideas were based on Benjamin Franklin’s one fluid theory, but with a Newtonian action-at-a-distance replacing Franklin’s electrical atmospheres. His explanations, most heavily mathematized, and the influence of mathematics in devising arguments and experiments show that his theory was mathematics-oriented instead of mechanistic-oriented (Johann Euler’s case).

This book studies the mathematization of physics, with a special emphasis on 18th century electrostatics as a case study. The mathematization of a scientific field is a fruitful yet underdeveloped topic that can be seen through different lenses. A noticeable one is the Inferential Conception proposed by Mark Colyvan and Otávio Bueno. In this regard, the use of mathematics is understood as a set of mappings relating the physical realm and the mathematical realm. However, the historical process related to the (...) use of mathematics remains unsolved; philosophical frameworks usually have a hard time dealing with historical dimensionality. Therefore, this book provides a study of the historical process of mathematization going beyond the framework in order to explain the use of mathematics a-historically, using the aforementioned investigation of 18th century electrostatics. The research developed gravitates around two centers; the history of physics and the philosophy of science, making the book of equal importance to both historians and philosophers of science. (shrink)

In this chapter, we shall define our major concepts, such as mathematization and mechanistic explanations. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the Inferential Conception, a useful philosophical framework developed to better understand how mathematics is used in the sciences, and Hacking’s styles of reasoning. Both philosophical theories will be fruitful in the historical analyses.

Introduction: Several lifestyle factors promote protection against Alzheimer's disease (AD) throughout a person's lifespan. Although such protective effects have been described for occupational cognitive requirements (OCR) in midlife, it is currently unknown whether they are conveyed by brain maintenance (BM), brain reserve (BR), or cognitive reserve (CR) or a combination of them. Methods: We systematically derived hypotheses for these resilience concepts and tested them in the population-based AgeCoDe cohort and memory clinic-based AD high-risk DELCODE study. The OCR score (OCRS) was (...) measured using job activities based on the O*NET occupational classification system. Four sets of analyses were conducted: (1) the interaction of OCR and APOE-ε4 with regard to cognitive decline (N = 2,369, AgeCoDe), (2) association with differentially shaped retrospective trajectories before the onset of dementia of the Alzheimer's type (DAT; N = 474, AgeCoDe), (3) cross-sectional interaction of the OCR and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) AD biomarkers and brain structural measures regarding memory function (N = 873, DELCODE), and (4) cross-sectional and longitudinal association of OCR with CSF AD biomarkers and brain structural measures (N = 873, DELCODE). Results: Regarding (1), higher OCRS was associated with a reduced association of APOE-ε4 with cognitive decline (mean follow-up = 6.03 years), consistent with CR and BR. Regarding (2), high OCRS was associated with a later onset but subsequently stronger cognitive decline in individuals converting to DAT, consistent with CR. Regarding (3), higher OCRS was associated with a weaker association of the CSF Aβ42/40 ratio and hippocampal volume with memory function, consistent with CR. Regarding (4), OCR was not associated with the levels or changes in CSF AD biomarkers (mean follow-up = 2.61 years). We found a cross-sectional, age-independent association of OCRS with some MRI markers, but no association with 1-year-change. OCR was not associated with the intracranial volume. These results are not completely consistent with those of BR or BM. Discussion: Our results support the link between OCR and CR. Promoting and seeking complex and stimulating work conditions in midlife could therefore contribute to increased resistance to pathologies in old age and might complement prevention measures aimed at reducing pathology. (shrink)

Latin America struggles to reach advanced Artificial Intelligence (AI) development due to limited resources and talent retention. However, different public indexes indicate the region’s potential to become an AI hub. Our analysis of research databases indicates a growing trend towards NeuroAI — an interdisciplinary field emerging from neuroscience and artificial intelligence — suggesting that this area of study may be a driving force behind the potential for Latin America. This paper explores how NeuroAI could enable Latin America to bridge the (...) development gap with global AI leaders, leveraging its potential to overcome resource constraints. We analyze strategies for integrating NeuroAI advancements into the private sector, which could provide essential financial support for highimpact scientific research and foster regional innovation. (shrink)

IntroductionThe idea of video recording in the operating room with panoramic cameras and microphones is a new concept that is changing the approach to medical activities in the OR. However, VR in the OR has brought up many concerns regarding patient privacy and has highlighted legal and ethical issues that were never previously exposed.AimTo review the literature concerning these aspects and provide a better ethical and legal understanding of the new challenges concerning VR in the OR.ConclusionsThere is a disparity between (...) the two main legal models concerning VR in the OR, namely the European legal system ) and the American legal framework ). This difference mainly deals with two distinct bioethical paradigms: GDPR places a strong emphasis on protecting patients’ privacy to improve the public health system, whereas HIPAA indicates the need to generate protocols to safeguard the risks connected to medical activity and patient privacy. Following from this point, we may argue that, at the ethical and bioethical level, GDPR and HIPAA depend mainly on two different ethical models: a perspective based on moral acquaintances and weak proceduralism, respectively. It is worth noting the importance of developing additional guidelines concerning different world regions to avoid the ethical problems that may emerge when simply applying a foreign paradigm to a very different culture. (shrink)

resumo: Este artigo tem como foco a influência e o domínio da tecnologia no nosso mundo atual. Através de um acompanhamento da reflexão de Heidegger sobre a técnica, buscamos responder a seguinte questão: o mundo, tomado como subsistência, é ele próprio o resultado de uma visão de mundo? Para alcançar uma resposta, primeiramente interrogamos os delineamentos de mundos, a partir do tema das visões de mundo. Encontramos, assim, o tema da postura humana enquanto elemento principal. Em segundo lugar, acompanhamos a (...) crítica de Heidegger à ciência moderna e à técnica, na qual constatamos uma ambiguidade fundamental na postura da Serenidade. Diante desse contexto, a resposta para o questionamento principal é afirmativa: o mundo enquanto subsistência é o resultado de uma visão de mundo. Contudo, uma inevitável participação do homem na atividade de “armazenamento”, conduz a uma esperança de reversão no processo de dominação da técnica. abstract: This article focuses on the influence and dominance of technique in our world today. By an incursion in Heidegger’s reflection on technique, we seek to answer the following question: is the world itself, taken as subsistence, the result of a worldview? To reach an answer, first, we question the outlining of worlds from the matter of worldviews. We find thus the theme of human posture as the main element. Secondly, we follow Heidegger’s critique of modern science and technique, where we see a fundamental ambiguity in the position of Serenity. In this context, the answer to the main question is affirmative: the world as subsistence is the result of a worldview. However, an inevitable human participation in the activity of “storage” leads to a hope of reversing technique’s domination process. (shrink)

We conducted a rapid review and quantitative summary of meta-analyses that have examined interventions which can be used by individuals during quarantine and social distancing to manage anxiety, depression, stress and subjective well-being. A literature search yielded 34 meta-analyses (total number of studies k = 1,390, n = 145,744) that were summarized. Overall, self-guided interventions showed small to medium effects in comparison to control groups. In particular, self-guided therapeutic approaches (including cognitive-behavioral, mindfulness, and acceptance-based interventions), selected positive psychology interventions, and (...) multi-component and activity-based interventions (music, physical exercise) showed promising evidence for effectiveness. Overall, self-guided interventions on average did not show the same degree of effectiveness as traditional guided individual or group therapies. There was no consistent evidence of dose effects, baseline differences and differential effectiveness of eHealth interventions. More research on the effectiveness of interventions in diverse cultural settings is needed. (shrink)

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra offers a fresh philosophical account of properties. How is it that two different things (such as two red roses) can share the same property (redness)? According to resemblance nominalism, things have their properties in virtue of resembling other things. This unfashionable view is championed with clarity and rigor.

The paper argues that grounding is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive. In arguing for that conclusion the paper also arguesthat truthmaking is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive.

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra presents an original study of the place and role of the Identity of Indiscernibles in Leibniz's philosophy. The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles rules out numerically distinct but perfectly similar things; Leibniz derived it from more basic principles and used it to establish important philosophical theses. Rodriguez-Pereyra aims to establish what Leibniz meant by the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, what his arguments for and from it were, and to assess those arguments and Leibniz's claims (...) about the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. He argues that Leibniz had a very strong version of the principle, according to which no possibilia (whether or not they belong to the same possible world) are intrinsically perfectly similar, where this excludes things that differ in magnitude alone. The book discusses Leibniz's arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles in the Meditation on the Principle of the Individual, the Discourse on Metaphysics, Notationes Generales, Primary Truths, the letter to Casati of 1689, the correspondence with Clarke, as well as the use of the Identity of Indiscernibles in Leibniz's arguments against the Cartesian conception of the material world, atoms, absolute space and time, the Lockean conception of the mind as a tabula rasa, and freedom of indifference. Rodriguez-Pereyra argues that the Identity of Indiscernibles was a central but inessential principle of Leibniz's philosophy. (shrink)

Resumen de tesis de Doctorado en Filosofía: La virtud cívica republicana en las sociedades contemporáneas de Marcelo Fernández Pavlovich.Directora: Dra. Graciela Vidiella. Fecha de defensa: 13 de setiembre de 2023.

This bulletin contains a summary of the main topics of discussion in truthmaker theory, namely: the definition of truthmakers, problems with Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Truthmaker Maximalism, the ontological burden of truthmakers and the recalcitrant topic of truthmakers for negative truths.

In this paper I undermine the Entailment Principle according to which if an entity is a truthmaker for a certain proposition and this proposition entails another, then the entity in question is a truthmaker for the latter proposition. I argue that the two most promising versions of the principle entail the popular but false Conjunction Thesis, namely that a truthmaker for a conjunction is a truthmaker for its conjuncts. One promising version of the principle understands entailment as strict implication but (...) restricts the field of application of the principle to purely contingent truths (i.e. those that contain no necessary proposition at any level of analysis). But a conjunction of purely contingent truths strictly implies its conjuncts. So this version of the principle is committed to the Conjunction Thesis. The same is true of the version of the principle where entailment is understood in the sense of systems T, R, and E of relevant logic, since in these systems conjunctions entail their conjuncts. I argue that the Conjunction Thesis is false because a truthmaker is that in virtue of what a certain proposition is true and it is false that, for example, what the proposition that Peter is a man is true in virtue of is the conjunctive fact that Peter is man and Saturn is a planet (or the facts that Peter is a man and that Saturn is a planet taken together). I also argue against other versions of the principle. (shrink)

1. The Bundle Theory I shall discuss is a theory about the nature of substances or concrete particulars, like apples, chairs, atoms, stars and people. The point of the Bundle Theory is to avoid undesirable entities like substrata that allegedly constitute particulars. The version of the Bundle Theory I shall discuss takes particulars to be entirely constituted by the universals they instantiate.' Thus particulars are said to be just bundles of universals. Together with the claim that it is necessary that (...) particulars have constituents, the fundamental claim of the Bundle Theory is: (BT) Necessarily, for every particular x and every entity y, y constitutes x if and only ify is a universal and x instantiates y. 2 The standard and supposedly devastating objection to the Bundle Theory is that it entails or is committed to a false version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (Armstrong 1978: 91, Loux 1998: 107), namely: (Pll) Necessarily, for all particulars x and y and every universal z, if z is instantiated by x if and only if z is instantiated byy, then x is numerically identical with y. The most famous counterexample to the Identity of Indiscernibles is that put forward by Max Black, consisting of a world where there are only two iron spheres two miles apart from each other, having the same diameter, temperature, colour, shape, size, etc (Black 1952: 156). Let us from now on think of the properties of the spheres in this world as universals. The possibility of this world, which I shall hereafter refer to as 'Black's world', makes (Pll) false.' And according to common philosophical opinion this means that the Bundle Theory is false.. (shrink)

Au cours de cet entretien, Emmanuel Renault nous offre un aperçu de la manière dont la thématique de la reconnaissance est traitée en France aujourd’hui, notamment à travers le renouveau des études sur Hegel et Marx. Il explique la façon dont la reconnaissance a pu s’ériger en paradigme (en dépit de ses usages multiples et variés en France comme ailleurs), au cours de la dernière décennie et le rôle joué par Axel Honneth dans ce procès. Finalement, il explicite sa manière (...) d’envisager la pratique de la philosophie politique et son projet d’une critique du capitalisme. Emmanuel Renault nous livre également un commentaire critique mais constructif sur la manière dont Paul Ricœur envisage la reconnaissance et suggère quelques pistes concernant les possibles développements futurs des usages de la reconnaissance. (shrink)

JANET DELGADO RODRIGUEZ | : The concept of vulnerability is central to current developments in bioethics, not only because of its analytic nature, but also due to its capacity for criticism. However, this concept has not been sufficiently developed, neither in the area of moral philosophy nor in bioethics. For this reason, it is necessary to define and analyze the conceptual framework in which the notion of vulnerability has been developed within the scope of bioethics. Thus, the purpose of (...) this paper is to indicate how the concept of vulnerability in the field of bioethics has been developed and what the main problems that derive from this approach are. Secondly, the paper analyzes some of the main philosophical approaches that I consider should be articulated in the expansion of a critical bioethics approach focused on the notion of vulnerability. To address this issue, I analyze the reflections that we find in the work of Martha Fineman, emphasizing the main relevant aspects for bioethics. Finally, I highlight the main implications of a theory of vulnerability for bioethics. | : Le concept de vulnérabilité est au coeur des développements actuels de la bioéthique, non seulement en raison de sa nature analytique, mais aussi en raison de son potentiel critique. Cependant, ce concept n’a pas été suffisamment développé, que ce soit dans le domaine de la philosophie morale ou de la bioéthique. Pour cette raison, il est nécessaire de définir et d’analyser le cadre conceptuel dans lequel la notion de vulnérabilité a été développée en bioéthique. Ainsi, le but de cet article est d’indiquer comment le concept de vulnérabilité a été développé dans le domaine de la bioéthique et quels sont les principaux problèmes découlant de cette approche. Deuxièmement, l’article analyse certaines des principales approches philosophiques qui devraient selon moi être articulées à une approche bioéthique critique centrée sur la notion de vulnérabilité. Pour traiter ce problème, j’analyse la réflexion de Martha Fineman, en soulignant les principaux aspects pertinents pour la bioéthique. Enfin, je souligne les principales implications d’une théorie de la vulnérabilité pour la bioéthique. (shrink)

In this article I address the Problem of Universals by answering questions about what facts a solution to the Problem of Universals should explain and how the explanation should go. I argue that a solution to the Problem of Universals explains the facts the Problem of Universals is about by giving the truthmakers (as opposed to the conceptual content and the ontological commitments) of the sentences stating those facts. I argue that the sentences stating the relevant facts are those like (...) 'a has the property F', that is, sentences stating that a particular has a certain property. Finally I show how answering these questions in this way transforms the Problem of Universals, traditionally conceived as the One over Many, that is, the problem of explaining how different particulars can have the same properties, into the Many over One, that is, the problem of explaining how the same particular can have different properties. The Problem of Universals is the problem of the Many over One. (shrink)

Universals have traditionally thought to obey the identity of indiscernibles, that is, it has traditionally been thought that there can be no perfectly similar universals. But at least in the conception of universals as immanent, there is nothing that rules out there being indiscernible universals. In this paper, I shall argue that there is useful work indiscernible universals can do, and so there might be reason to postulate indiscernible universals. In particular, I shall argue that postulating indiscernible universals can allow (...) a theory of universals to identify particulars with bundles of universals, and that postulating indiscernible universals can allow a theory of universals to develop an account of the resemblance of quantitative universals that avoids the objections that Armstrong’s account faces. Finally, I shall respond to some objections and I shall undermine the criterion of distinction between particulars and universals that says that the distinction between particulars and universals lies in that while there can be indiscernible particulars, there cannot be indiscernible universals. (shrink)

The subtraction argument, originally put forward by Thomas Baldwin (1996), is intended to establish Metaphysical Nihilism, the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects. Some modified versions of the argument have been proposed in order to avoid some difficulties faced by the original argument. In this paper I shall concentrate on two of those versions, the so-called subtraction argument* (presented and defended in Rodriguez-Pereyra 1997, 2000, 2002), and Efird and Stoneham’s recent version of the argument (Efird and (...) Stoneham 2005). I shall defend the subtraction argument* from Alexander Paseau’s (2006) objection that because a crucial premise of the subtraction argument* may have no plausibility independent from Metaphysical Nihilism, the subtraction argument* is not suasive. Although Paseau focuses on the subtraction argument*, I shall point out that Efird and Stoneham could reply to Paseau’s objection in the same way. Thus there are (at least) two suasive versions of the subtraction argument that establish Metaphysical Nihilism. But are those two arguments equally good? I shall argue that the subtraction argument* is preferable to Efird and Stoneham’s argument. (shrink)

Peter Milne has tried to refure Truthmaker Maximalism. the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker, by producing a simple and direct counterexample to it, the sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. I argue that, contrary to what Milne argues, on Truthmaker Maximalism M is equivalent to the Liar, which gives the truthmaker maximalist a way to defend his position from Milne's counterexample: to argue that M expresses no proposition.

I believe in metaphysical nihilism, the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects, because I believe in a version of the subtraction argument, the subtraction argument*, that proves it. But both Jonathan Lowe (2002) and Alexander Paseau (2002) express doubts about the subtraction argument*. Paseau thinks the argument is invalid, and Lowe argues that invoking concrete* objects is unnecessary. Furthermore Lowe attempts to rebut my objections (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2000) to his anti-nihilist argument (Lowe 1998). In this paper I (...) defend the subtraction argument* from Paseau's and Lowe's criticisms as well as show that the premises of Lowe's anti-nihilist argument are still lacking support. (shrink)

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereya provides a new English translation of G. W. Leibniz's Discourse on Metaphysics, complete with a critical introduction and a comprehensive philosophical commentary. In this fundamental work, Leibniz sets out a metaphysics for Christianity and provides answers to the central metaphysical questions.

This paper is a response to replies by Dan López de Sa and Mark Jago to my ‘Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjuction Thesis’. In that paper, my main aim was to argue against the Entailment Principle by arguing against the Conjunction Thesis, which is entailed by the Entailment Principle. In the course of so doing, although not essential for my project in that paper, I defended the Disjunction Thesis. López de Sa has objected both to my defence of the Disjunction (...) Thesis and my case against the Conjunction Thesis. I shall show that his objections are unfounded and based on serious misunderstandings of my position, what the relevant debate is, and some fundamental notions of Truthmaker Theory. Jago argues that accepting the Disjunction Thesis and rejecting the Conjunction Thesis is hard to maintain. But I show that Jago has not shown that accepting the Disjunction Thesis while rejecting the Conjunction Thesis is impossible or even hard to maintain. Jago believes that, to accept the Disjunction Thesis while rejecting the Conjunction Thesis, one needs to reject his axiom (T3), which says that all the truthmakers for <P&P> are truthmakers for <P>. I argue that there are reasons to reject such a principle, and the version of it that says that what makes <P&P> true makes <P> true. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the modal logic with both $$\Box $$ and $$\Diamond $$ arising from Kripke models with a crisp accessibility and whose propositions are valued over the standard Gödel algebra $$[0,1]_G$$. We provide an axiomatic system extending the one from Caicedo and Rodriguez (J Logic Comput 25(1):37–55, 2015) for models with a valued accessibility with Dunn axiom from positive modal logics, and show it is strongly complete with respect to the intended semantics. The axiomatizations of the (...) most usual frame restrictions are given too. We also prove that in the studied logic it is not possible to get $$\Diamond $$ as an abbreviation of $$\Box $$, nor vice-versa, showing that indeed the axiomatic system we present does not coincide with any of the mono-modal fragments previously axiomatized in the literature. (shrink)

Leibniz was a philosopher of principles: the principles of Contradiction, of Sufficient Reason, of Identity of Indiscernibles, of Plenitude, of the Best, and of Continuity are among the most famous Leibnizian principles. In this article I shall focus on the first three principles; I shall discuss various formulations of the principles (sect. 1), what it means for these theses to have the status of principles or axioms in Leibniz’s philosophy (sect. 2), the fundamental character of the Principles of Contradiction and (...) Sufficient Reason (sect. 3), some attempts to demonstrate the Principles of Contradiction and Sufficient Reason (sect. 4), and one attempt to demonstrate the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (sect. 5). The main results of the chapter are summarized in a short conclusion (sect. 6). (shrink)

The object of this paper is to provide a solution to Nelson Goodman’s Imperfect Community difficulty as it arises for Resemblance Nominalism, the view that properties are classes of resembling particulars. The Imperfect Community difficulty consists in that every two members of a class resembling each other is not sufficient for it to be a class such that there is some property common to all their members, even if ‘x resembles y’ is understood as ‘x and y share some property’. (...) In the paper I explain and criticise several solutions to the difficulty. Then I develop my own solution, which is not subject to the objections I make to the other solutions, and which accords completely with the basic tenets of Resemblance Nominalism. (shrink)

As a result of recent corporate scandals, several rules have focused on the role played by Boards of Directors on the planning and monitoring of corporate codes of ethics. In theory, outside directors are in a better position than insiders to protect and further the interests of all stakeholders because of their experience and their sense of moral and legal obligations. Female directors also tend to be more sensitive to ethics according to several past studies which explain this affirmation by (...) early gender socialization, the fact that women are thought to place a greater emphasis on harmonious relations and the fact that men and women use different ethical frameworks in their judgments. The goal of this paper is to determine the influence of these characteristics of the Board in terms of promoting and hindering the creation of a code of ethics. Our findings show that a greater number of female directors does not necessarily lead to more ethical companies. Moreover, within Europe as a continent, board ownership leads to an entrenchment of upper-level management, generating a divergence between the ethical interests of owners and managers. In light of this situation, the presence of independent directors is necessary to reduce such conflicts. (shrink)

According to one of Leibniz's theories of contingency a proposition is contingent if and only if it cannot be proved in a finite number of steps. It has been argued that this faces the Problem of Lucky Proof , namely that we could begin by analysing the concept ‘Peter’ by saying that ‘Peter is a denier of Christ and …’, thereby having proved the proposition ‘Peter denies Christ’ in a finite number of steps. It also faces a more general but (...) related problem that we dub the Problem of Guaranteed Proof . We argue that Leibniz has an answer to these problems since for him one has not proved that ‘Peter denies Christ’ unless one has also proved that ‘Peter’ is a consistent concept, an impossible task since it requires the full decomposition of the infinite concept ‘Peter’. We defend this view from objections found in the literature and maintain that for Leibniz all truths about created individual beings are contingent. (shrink)

By nihilism I shall understand the thesis that it is metaphysically possible that there are no concrete objects. I think there is a version of an argu- ment, the subtraction argument, which proves nihilism nicely (see Baldwin 1996 and Rodriguez-Pereyra 1997). But E. J. Lowe, who is no nihilist, has a very interesting argument purporting to show that concrete objects exist necessarily (Lowe 1996, 1998). In this paper I shall defend nihilism from Lowe’s argument.

Bertrand Russell argued that any attempt to get rid of universals in favor of resemblances fails. He argued that no resemblance theory could avoid postulating a universal of resemblance without falling prey to a vicious infinite regress. He added that admitting such a universal of resemblance made it pointless to avoid other universals. In this paper I defend resemblance nominalism from both of Russell's points by arguing that (a) resemblance nominalism can avoid the postulation of a universal of resemblance without (...) falling into a vicious infinite regress, and (b) even if resemblance nominalism had to admit a universal of resemblance, this would not make it pointless to avoid postulating other universals. (shrink)

Peter van Inwagen has given an answer to the question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’. His answer is: Because there being nothing is as improbable as anything can be: it has probability 0. Here I shall examine his argument for this answer and I shall argue that it does not work because no good reasons have been given for two of the argument’s premises and that the conclusion of the argument does not constitute an answer to the question (...) van Inwagen wanted to answer. (shrink)

In this chapter I shall reply to a pair of articles in which the main contention of my “Why truthmakers” – namely, that an important class of synthetic true propositions have entities as truth-makers – is rejected. In §§1–5 I reply to Jennifer Hornsby’s “Truth without Truthmaking Entities” (2005) and in §§6–7 I reply to Julian Dodd’s “Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles” (2007).

In this paper I argue that Modal Realism, the thesis that there exist non-actual possible individuals and worlds, can be made compatible with Metaphysical Nihilism, the thesis that it is possible that nothing concrete exists. Modal Realism as developed by Lewis rules out the possibility of a world where nothing concrete exists and so conflicts with Metaphysical Nihilism. In the paper I argue that Modal Realism can be modified so as to be compatible with Metaphysical Nihilism. Such a modification makes (...) Modal Realism neither incur further theoretical costs nor lose its theoretical benefits. Thus such a modification constitutes an improvement of Modal Realism. (shrink)